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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the East Asian Currency Crisis to examine what factors led to the crisis and 
the differential impact across countries.  Empirical data of 7 Asian countries over the period 
1990 – 1996 is examined.  The sample of seven countries is divided into two categories; crisis 
countries and affected countries.  Comparison of several economic indicators is made between 
these two categories to determine what factors led to the severe consequences in the crisis 
countries as opposed to affected countries, all of which were subject to contagion. 
 
The crisis countries were found to have had aggressive growth policies that were fuelled by 
reflationary strategies; particularly rapid monetary growth and capital inflows.  With higher 
relative inflation and repressed interest rates, exchange rate equilibrium as dictated by 
purchasing power and interest rate parities were out of line given pegged exchange rates.  The 
currencies had become overvalued.  The result being current account deficits that were financed 
by capital inflows, increasingly in the form of short term foreign currency denominated loans. 
 
The combined impact of all of this had been to increase the crisis countries’ vulnerability to a 
speculative attack and a resulting self-fulfilling crisis. 
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In the annals of Asian economic history, July 1997 is likely to go down as the 
month of infamy.  What began as a speculative attack on the Thai Baht quickly 
spread as “Contagion” to the Philippines, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia.  
Singapore and Taiwan were affected too, but to a much lesser degree.  Hong Kong 
– the citadel of Asian capitalism saw some spectacular attacks and an equally 
spectacular defense of the Hong Kong dollar.  The quickness and the severity with 
which the currencies fell caught many by surprise.  Within a three-month period 
(July – October 1997), the Baht had fallen close to 40%, the Philippine peso and 
the Ringgit by about 27% and the Indonesia Rupiah by 40% against the US Dollar.  
South Korea saw its Won fall almost 35% against the US Dollar in the same 
period. 
 
What began as a speculative attack on currencies quickly turned into a stock 
market meltdown and triggered a regional banking crisis.  Official reaction has 
gone from one of shock to anger and on to despair.  Contagion and currency 
manipulation were pointed out as the culprits.    Central banks began the crisis 
with valiant attempts at defending their currencies but quickly gave up and chose 
the alternative of floating their currency.  Governments, outside of Thailand have 
chosen to blame the crisis on contagion.  The contagion argument has been 
popular, particularly in official circles for it deflects attention from policy 
problems that there might have been.  The contagion argument portrays the 
problem as one of a bystander caught in an avalanche caused by currency 
speculators.  While the contagion argument is a plausible and relevant one, it 
ignores the many differences among the Asian economies that have suffered.  
Furthermore, the contagion argument glosses over the underlying macro economic 
weaknesses that were evident. 
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Objective and Motivation 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the East Asian crisis to examine what 
factors led to the crisis and what lessons could be learnt for the future.  What 
makes this crisis interesting is that it does not conform with the classic speculative 
attack models.  In the models (notably; Krugman, 1979), the causal agents are 
usually profligate governments (large budget deficits), low growth rates, low 
savings, low investments and high inflation.  None of these was the case of the 
East Asian countries.  If anything, these countries, going into the crisis, had 
surplus budgets, had high savings rates, low inflation, high growth rates and very 
high investment rates.  Still, despite these differences there were many similarities 
in the symptoms/indicators between the Asian countries and that of previous 
financial crises – notably Mexico. 
 
With the exception of a handful of scholars (Krugman, Alwyn Young), the 
international finance community had by and large applauded the very policies that 
are now being criticized.  Free marketers had pointed to the open markets and 
liberalizations that these countries had undertaken as the reasons for their success.  
Proponents of interventionist policies had cited the industrial policies, most 
notably that of South Korea’s.  Even Krugman’s TFPG argument predicted only a 
slowdown in growth not a financial crash.  So, what is it that caused the crisis?  
Was it irrational markets and bad equilibria or were there fundamental weaknesses 
in macro economic policies?  This paper will argue that it was a combination of 
both and then some.  The paper is divided into 6 sections.  Section 2 below, 
provides a review of the relevant literature.  Section 3, gives an overview of the 
Asian currency crisis while Section 4 examines indepth some of the key causal 
factors.  The fifth section examines issues of Vulnerability, Herding Behaviour 
and Self-fulfilling crisis.  The section also makes a comparison between the 
Mexican Peso crisis of 1995 and the current Asian one.  The importance of 
multiple policy options in defending currencies is shown by comparing the case of 
Hong Kong with Malaysia.  The final section, section 6, concludes.   
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Section 2.0 
 
2.1:  Literature Review 
 
Economic models and theories of currency crises appear to have undergone an 
evolution over time.  The first generation models, beginning with Krugman 
(1979), view currency crises as speculative attacks resulting from deteriorating 
fundamentals.  When the underlying fundamentals are inconsistent with the 
pegged exchange rate a speculative attack results.  The original model of pegged 
rates has been extended to include currency bands, crawling pegs etc..1  Indicators 
of a potential attack would be excessive monetary growth, budget deficits, 
declining competitiveness, current account deficits and reserve losses.  Though 
straight forward in implication, these models could not explain currency crises that 
took place even when there were no monetary excesses or budget deficits.  This 
led to the development of a second generation of models which included the role 
of expectations and self fulfilling speculative attacks.  Here, countries become 
vulnerable to attacks when their fundamentals have deteriorated to certain levels 
sufficient to trigger a speculative attack. 
 
In seeking to explain currency crashes in the spirit of first generation models, 
Frankel & Kose (1996), examine annual data for 100 countries over the 20-year 
period 1971 to 1992.  They examine 16 economic indicators encompassing four 
broad categories which they classify; Macroeconomic indicators, External 
variables, Debt composition and Foreign variables.  Using an event-study 
methodology for a 3-year period before and after a crash, they analyze 117 
currency crashes.  They find that there were several common features of crash 
countries.  These countries had high levels of debt, most of which was financed by 
commercial banks, on variable interest rates and of short term maturity.  FDI 
inflows had significantly tapered off just before the crash but the slack had been 
taken up by short term capital inflows.  Crashes were often preceded by rising 
interest rates in developed countries.  Crash currencies were overvalued by at least 
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10%, international reserves were low and falling.  Domestic credit growth had 
been rapidly increasing while output growth per capita had been falling.  Though 
the countries had current account and budget deficits, these deficits were found to 
be shrinking just before the crash.2   
 
Goldfajn and Valdes (1997) examine whether overvaluation and expectations are 
predictors of currency crises.  Using a simple CPI adjusted measure of 
overvaluation, they find that overvaluations are good predictors of impending 
crisis.  However, using survey data of expectations, they find that exchange rate 
expectations cannot predict crises.  Forecasters had been surprised by crashes.  
This results are certainly contradictory.  Rational traders/investors would 
incorporate the overvaluation in forming their expectations.  Based on these 
contradicting results, the authors conclude that currency crises are largely 
unpredictable events. 
 
Calvo and Mendoza (1996), argue that the Mexican Peso crisis of December 1994 
is an example of a new kind of BOP crisis in an era of liberalized financial 
markets and global capital flows.  They argue that contrary to classic models (first 
generation models), the Peso crisis did not have its roots in fiscal deficits nor 
imbalances in capital flows.  Instead, the problem had its roots in 2 key areas.  (1) 
imbalances in the stock of liquid financial assets versus gross reserves and (2) 
herding behavior that leads to self fulfilling attacks.  An over expansion of central 
bank credit had led to large gaps between M2 measured in dollars and gross 
foreign reserves, additionally, there was also a large gap between outstanding 
amount of short term public debt and gross reserves.  (Short term debt being 
approximately 3 times more).  These had been financed with foreign capital 
inflows.  Though the existence of such gaps need not necessarily set off a crisis, 
they certainly increase the vulnerability of the pegged exchange rate to exogenous 
shocks.  Given the imbalances a sudden shock can quickly drain reserves and 
thereby make the fixed exchange rate unsustainable. 
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Given the rapid credit expansion, domestic banks were overexposed.  In the event 
of a shock, the central bank would have to choose between raising interest rates to 
defend the peg which would mean allowing domestic banks to collapse or keep a 
lid on interest rates, safe the domestic banking sector and let the currency devalue.  
A falling currency would of course hurt the foreign investors who had financed the 
short term capital inflows. 
 
In the event, it was expectations that the central bank would choose to save the 
banks and not the exchange rate that set off the massive outflows that caused the 
precipitous fall in the Peso.  The authors argue that it was a self fulfilling attack 
within a framework of herding behavior on the part of investors. 
 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), explore why some emerging markets were hit 
by financial crisis in 1995 while others were not.  They seek to find a set of 
fundamentals that could explain contagion.  They argue that Mexico’s crisis was 
one of a self-fulfilling speculative attack which then let to contagion in countries 
such as Argentina, Brazil and the Philippines.  They test several hypothesis to 
examine why contagion affected some countries and not others.  They show that 
while Mexico and the earlier mentioned countries were affected, others such as 
Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia which had ‘worse’ fundamentals (larger current 
account deficits for example) were unaffected. 
 
Analyzing data for 20 emerging markets, they argue that for contagion (and crisis) 
to happen there must have been some ‘degree of previous misbehavior’.  
Typically, this ‘misbehavior’ constituted three policy areas (I) having maintained 
an overvalued exchange rate (II) having had lending/domestic credit booms and 
(III) having low reserves relative to short term commitments of the central bank.  
Countries that had misbehaved in these three key areas were found to have 
suffered contagion while those that did not have these shortcomings suffer from 
minimal or short lived contagion.  The authors argue that prudence in managing 
exchange rates and the banking systems appears to pay off in reduced 
vulnerability. 
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Despite larger capital inflows, the authors find that the Asian emerging countries 
seemed better able to absorb the inflows without substantial domestic inflation.  
They argue that these could be due to the better fiscal restraint of these countries. 
 
In a similar vein, Otker and Pazarbastoglu (1997) in analyzing episodes of 
pressures on select ERM currencies suggest that speculative pressures are 
associated with a deterioration in economic fundamentals.  Expansionary credit 
policies and widening government deficits appear to trigger speculative attacks 
and lead to increased probability of devaluations.  However, they find that while 
consistent macroeconomic policies are necessary for maintaining pegs, they may 
not necessarily be sufficient. 
 
Mc Kinnon & Pill (1998) use a Fisherian Model of the ‘overborrowing syndrome’ 
and compare the overborrowing episodes of the Asian Crisis countries with that of 
Mexico and Chile.  They argue that while important similarities exist, the Asian 
crisis has been exacerbated by the unhedged foreign exchange positions of Asian 
banks.  Overborrowing has serious macroeconomic costs and the authors argue 
that improving the institutional infrastructure of financial supervision is the only 
effective way of mitigating such costs.   
 
Section 3.0:  What Went Wrong in East Asia 
 
In this section, we examine in depth the East Asian currency crisis.  The analysis 
is carried out using annual data over the seven-year period 1990 to 1996.3  A total 
of seven East Asian countries are studied.  These being, Thailand, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan.  In much of the 
analysis that follows; the sample of seven countries are divided into two 
categories; crisis-countries and affected countries.  The first four countries which 
had the most severe impact are categorized as crisis countries while the latter 
three, for want of a better terminology – affected countries.4  Except where 
otherwise stated, all data were derived from Datastream International.  
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The section is arranged as follows, we begin with a brief overview of the Mexican 
Peso crisis of 1995.  This is done solely to provide perspective and to draw 
parallels between that crisis and the East Asian one.  This is followed by an 
overview of factors leading to the crisis in Asia.  We then examine in depth the 
‘causal’ factors. 
 
The Mexican Peso crisis; Asia’s wakeup Call ? 
 
The period leading up to the crisis in December 1994 had been a prosperous one 
for Mexico.  The country had recovered from the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980’s.  The 
1986 oil price collapse had been the last of a series of economic shocks that the 
country faced in the 1980’s.  In December 1987, the government had formulated 
an exchange rate based stabilization program.  Aside from imposing monetary and 
fiscal discipline, the program undertook aggressive trade liberalization, 
deregulation and privatization of several public enterprises.  
 
By 1988 the economy had recovered sharply.  Over the six year period preceding 
the crisis, 1988 – 1994, GDP growth had been robust with consumption growing 
at 30% and investment growth 70%.5  With such rapid growth in consumption and 
investment there clearly had to be a savings – investment gap.  This gap was being 
financed with imports, which had grown 300%, M2 which increased more than 
200% (both over the six years) and large capital inflows. 
 
There were three consequent problems as a result of this.  First, the current 
account deficit ballooned from $6 billion in 1989 to approximately $20 billion by 
1993.  (7% of GDP).  Second, the even larger capital inflows meant that net 
reserves were increasing rapidly and given the crawling peg, domestic money 
supply had to increase.  As a result inflation was being fueled.  With the crawling 
peg not adjusting sufficiently to the inflation differential with the US; the Peso 
was gradually being overvalued.  By 1994, the real exchange rate against the US$, 
was overvalued by about 35% in terms of relative CPI. 
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The third problem was that of a serious maturity mismatch.  The capital inflows 
over the six years were roughly 25% in the form of FDI, another 25% or so in the 
form of stock market investment and the largest, 50% in the form of short term 
bond purchases (cetes).  Part of the reason for the huge bias in short term 
instruments had to do with the central bank itself.  In its efforts to sterilize the 
capital inflows, the central bank, in the absence of a well developed domestic bond 
market resorted to selling short term bonds.  Yet, the money was being used to 
undertake long term infrastructural needs. 
 
Though GDP growth had begun to taper in 1994, the government’s fiscal balance 
was still in surplus.  For the full year prior to the crisis, the government reported a 
fiscal surplus equivalent to about 1% of GDP.  (As opposed to a 11% deficit in 
1988).  Reserves were at record levels.  Still, the higher inflation and interest rate 
levels relative to the US, meant that the exchange rate was out of line.  Despite 
widespread rumors that a devaluation was in the offing, the central bank held to its 
crawling peg schedule.  The political problems preceding the 1994 presidential 
elections did not help matters.  The markets were jittery.  On Dec. 20, despite 
consistent previous denials, the central bank announced a 15% devaluation against 
the US$.  The Peso was set at 4.0 against the Dollar. 
 
Ironically, it was the devaluation itself that set off the crisis.  It was felt that the 
devaluation was too little too late.  As late as November 94, both M1 and M2 had 
been increasing rapidly.  Following the August elections, the Mexican central 
bank had actually moved to reduce interest rates.  Yet, any consideration of a 
devaluation was denied.  So, when the announcement came, the government lost 
its credibility, and there was a loss of confidence.  A massive capital outflow 
ensued.  Since the earlier capital inflows had been mostly of a short term nature, it 
was easy to move funds out.  What began initially with foreign investors and fund 
managers quickly led to Mexican citizens selling the Peso.  A mere two days after 
announcing the devaluation, the government on Dec. 22 announced that it was 
allowing the Peso to float.  The Peso plunged, interest rates soared, reserves were 
 11 
quickly lost to even further capital outflows.  Within the week, the Peso was at 5.3 
against the Dollar.  A 25% depreciation within a week. 
   
The East Asian Crisis 
 
East Asia’a financial crisis began with the speculative attack on the Thai Baht in 
May 97.  Despite attempts by the central bank, the Thais were forced to float the 
Baht on 2nd July.  Pressure built on the Ringgit and other regional currencies.  A 
little over a week later, the Philippines was forced to float the Peso and in August 
the Indonesian Rupiah was also floated.  All four currencies had been on pegged 
exchange rate regimes.  By Feb. 98, the Ringgit and the Peso had lost close to 
40%; the Baht 45%, the Won 50% and the Indonesian Rupiah some 75%.  The 
Singapore dollar and the NTD had fallen approximately 17% while the HK$ had 
remained unchanged.  For a region that had had the fastest growth rates and been 
dubbed “miracle” economies this was a bitter experience. 
 
In what follows we begin with an overview of what led to the crisis and then 
examine in greater detail the main causal factors.  Table 1 below shows nominal 
GDP growth over the 7 year period 1990 – 96 for our sample East Asian countries.  
Each of the crisis countries; Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea and Malaysia, has 
had double digit growth rates exceeding 11% in each year.  The average annual 
growth for these countries is approximately 12.5%.  In cumulative terms, each 
country has more than doubled its GDP in 1996 compared to 1990 levels.  For the 
affected countries group; Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan growth had been 
slightly less.  Average annual growth for these countries is a shade less than 10%.  
Note that Taiwan has had the slowest annual and cumulative growths while 
Indonesia the highest.  In cumulative terms Indonesia had been growing more than 
twice that of Taiwan. 
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Table 1 
 
1990 – 96 Nominal GDP Growth % 
 
 
 Cumulative Compounded 
 Compounded Growth Annual Growth 
   
Malaysia 116% 11.63% 
Thailand 110.6% 11.22% 
Indonesia 172.3% 15.4% 
South Korea 117.4% 11.7% 
   
Average  12.5% 
   
Singapore 95.4% 10.04% 
Hong Kong 105% 10.8% 
Taiwan 73.6% 8.2% 
   
Average  9.68% 
 
 
Growth in East Asia had been very rapid since 1987.  Following the recession of 
the mid 80s, GDP growth had steadily risen to peak in 1993.  (See Table A1, 
Appendix).  From 1995 there had actually been a slight dip in growth rates.  Were 
these growth rates sustainable?  If investment is what drives GDP growth, rapid 
GDP growth would require increased investment financing.  Just as a company 
experiencing rapid sales growth would have constantly increasing funding 
requirements, investment expenditure has to be rapidly increasing to drive GDP 
growth. 
 
Though we do not see much of a difference in growth rates between the group of 
crisis countries and affected countries, the key to understanding what made the 
difference in severity of crisis would be in how the growth was financed.  As we 
will see later, there was a major difference between the two groups in financing 
growth.  Aside from this, a number of unfavorable factors were impacting the 
region.  Internally, the countries were facing infrastructural bottlenecks, wage 
pressures were rising and there was an overall reduction in competitiveness. 
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Externally, the opening up of countries like China, Vietnam, etc. were also 
working against the crisis countries.  The computer hardware sector suffered a 
slump in western demand in 1995 causing serious problems within the region’s 
critical electronics industry.  Additionally, China’s devaluation of the Renminbi by 
33% in 1994, the weakening of the Yen in 1995/96 and Japan’s prolonged descend 
into a downturn did not help matters.  In the face of such constraints, it would have 
been prudent to have adopted a slower growth strategy.  But it was not to be.  
Average growth for 1996 for the crisis countries was 12%. 
 
The growth pump was being primed by three broad means; (1) rapid domestic 
monetary growth, (2) large current account deficits and (3) capital inflows.  Each 
of these means had its accompanying problems.  For example, the monetary 
growth led to inflationary pressures and artificially low interest rates.  In the face 
of pegged exchange rates these were causing deviations.  The currencies had all 
become overvalued.  The combination of events and policy stance had set the 
exchange rates up for a fall.  A number of warnings had been present.  Following 
the Mexican crisis, regional currencies came under attack in early 1995.  
Successful defense by the central banks had maintained the pegs.  The IMF it 
appears had also warned several countries in the region, particularly Thailand.  Yet 
another signal was the slump in stock market indices.  Thailand had seen heavy 
selling and a falling stock index as early as mid 1996.  Still, what was surprising 
was the speed with which things unraveled with the speculative attack on the Baht 
in July 97. 
 
Given the breadth of the crisis, it will be foolhardy to point to any one factor as the 
cause of the crisis.  The differences in economic structure and profile even among 
the crisis countries cannot be ignored.  Yet, there were many similarities among 
them.  We now examine some of these commonalties and make the case for why 
they mattered. 
Section 4 
 
4.1:  Monetary Policy:  Rapid Expansion 
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 Even a cursory observation of the fiscal and monetary data points to a clear 
contradiction.  None of the countries in our sample had any serious fiscal deficits.  
On average, over the 7-year period all the governments have had fiscal surpluses.  
Where there are deficits they are infrequent and of insignificant size.  Essentially, 
these governments have not in any way been profligate, if anything, strictly from a 
fiscal viewpoint, they have been prudent.  The same however cannot be said of 
their monetary policies.  Table 2 below shows the growth in Monetary Aggregates 
M1 and M2. 
 
Table 2 
 
1990 – 96; Nominal Monetary Growth % 
 
Country M1  M2  
 Compounded 
Annual Growth 
(%) 
Cumulative 
Growth 
(%)  
Compounded 
Growth 
(%) 
Cumulative 
Growth (%) 
     
Malaysia 13.7 145.6 15.5 174 
Thailand 11.7 117 13.6 143.7 
Indonesia 15.2 169 19.2 241 
South Korea 13.9 148.6 14.6 160 
                            Average 13.7 145 15.7 180 
     
Singapore 8.5 77 8.8 81 
Hong Kong 10.6 102 11.1 109 
Taiwan 4.9 39.6 12.3 125 
                            Average 8.0 72.9 10.7 105 
United States 4.53  2.14  
 
The rapid growth in the monetary aggregates is clearly evident.  In the case of M1, 
Taiwan has the lowest annual growth rate and the lowest cumulative growth.  At 
the opposite end is Indonesia with 15.2% annual growth and 169% cumulative 
growth.  (Recall from earlier that Indonesia had had the fastest GDP growth while 
Taiwan the lowest).  As a group the affected countries have 8.0% average annual 
M1 growth compared to 13.7% for the crisis countries.  Cumulative growth in M1 
is 73% and 145% respectively.  The crisis countries therefore have had 
approximately 71% higher annual growth of M1 and in excess of 100% higher 
cumulative growth relative to the affected countries group.  M2 tells a similar 
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story.  As a group, the crisis countries have had approximately 50% higher annual 
M2 growth and 71% higher cumulative growth. 
 
What would the impact be of this much looser monetary policy?  Table A2 in 
appendix shows real GDP growth for the sample countries.  Comparing the real 
growth rates to monetary growth shows the extent of policy looseness.  For the 
crisis countries, average annual growth in both M1 and M2 has been more than 
twice the growth in real GDP.  When monetary growth is much faster than real 
GDP growth, the obvious result will be inflation.  This is borne out in Table A5 of 
the Appendix.  Crisis countries as a whole had an average inflation rate of 5.75% 
per year while the other group had 4.35%.  These numbers however do not seem 
to reflect the much higher money supply aggregates for the crisis countries.  There 
are two reasons for this.  The first, has to do with Hong Kong’s CPI numbers.  
Notice that at 7.2% annual inflation it is much higher than Singapore and Taiwan.  
This increases the average for the affected countries.  Excluding Hong Kong, we 
get a realistic 3% CPI growth average for that group.  A second reason, aside from 
problems of CPI measurement is probably the absorption argument.  Sachs (1995), 
argues that absorption rates tend to be better in labor intensive as opposed to 
capital intensive economies. 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2:  Repressed Interest Rates 
 
If nominal interest rates are positively correlated to inflation rates than they should 
reflect the inflation premiums.  Yet, many economists have pointed out that one of 
key problems in East Asia has been repressed interest rates.  Interest rates were 
said to have been kept artificially low – partly through official mandate and 
intervention and partly through rapid money supply growth.  We have seen the 
growth in monetary aggregates, to see if interest rates have indeed been repressed 
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the following stylized technique is used.  The absolute percentage change in 
nominal interest rate6 is computed yearly.  The average of this absolute percentage 
change for the 6 years is then determined.  In an idealized situation, the average 
percentage change in nominal interest rate over the 6 years should equal the 
average annual inflation rate over the period.  The results are shown in Table A6, 
Appendix.  In all cases, nominal interest rates did not keep pace with inflation.  As 
expected the deviation is highest for Indonesia, Korea and Thailand.  Among 
affected countries Hong Kong again sticks out.  It appears from these results that 
interest rates have indeed been lower than they should have been. 
 
4.3:  Rising Expectations and Asset Inflation 
 
Consider the implications of our discussion thus far, when we have an 
environment of rapid GDP growth accompanied by rapid growth in money supply 
and repressed interest rates, it sets off dynamics that initiates a host of other 
problems.  One would be rising expectations or even “irrational exuberance” in a 
boom time atmosphere.  The problem here is that rising expectations can become 
self-fulfilling.  If asset prices are determined as the present value of future cash 
flows discounted with adjustment for growth rates, it is easy to see how a  
 
 
combination of rising expectations and repressed interest rates can set off a 
feeding frenzy.  Suppose, cash flows from an investment increase at some rate g;  
then an asset’s price would be given as; 
 
gk
CF
Po
−
=
1
 
  
Where; Po = Market price of asset. 
  CF1 = is the expected cash flow in the forthcoming period. 
  k = cost of funds 
g = growth rate of future cash flow (Note: Mathematically 
it can be shown that g will equal capital gains). 
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Rising expectations could mean that cash flows in the immediate forthcoming 
period and subsequent periods are expected to increase.  This means both CF1 and 
g increase.  If the stock of available investible funds is unchanged (assuming 
money supply is neutral), K, the cost of funds increases since there is increased 
competition for funds given rising expectations.  This acts as an automatic 
stabilizer since the increases in CF1  and g, will be offset or at least muted by the 
increase in K.  Asset prices remain unchanged or at best, experience marginal 
increases.  However, what would happen if money supply is rapidly increasing 
thereby increasing the available stock of investible funds?  The result would be to 
keep K at the same rate or worse reduce the cost of funds.  The overall impact 
would be steadily increasing prices.  With realization of the previous period’s 
capital gains (g), expectations rise even further, feeding on itself and we have an 
asset inflation or worse, the making of an asset bubble. 
 
There are two related problems to asset price inflation.  The first is that with rising 
capital gains returns, it mostly leads to overinvestment.  Thus, the average 
investment to GDP ratio approximates 40% for the crisis countries.  Aside from 
the fact that all these investments have to be financed, there is a more serious 
problem.  This second problem is that of a misallocation of resources.  Because 
asset inflation is more often isolated to certain sectors, particularly those that are 
malleable to speculative activity – such as the stock market and the real 
estate/property sectors, there is usually a misallocation of resources.  Funds flow 
into these sectors attracted by the easy/quick returns.  As these are non tradeables, 
the tradeables sector suffers.  To a large extent the problems of East Asia have to 
do with asset inflation and overinvestment particularly in the real sector/property 
sector.  The problem was most acute in Thailand and Indonesia and to a much 
lesser extent in Malaysia.  In Korea, the problem appears not so much to have 
been speculative asset inflation but one of overinvestment in production capacity.  
Despite huge overhangs in capacity, the Chaebols invested heavily in additional 
capacity.  This was in industries such as Autos, Iron & Steel, Cement, Chemicals, 
Semi Conductors etc. all of which already had excessive capacities.  The idea was 
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to gain market share through the increased price competitiveness afforded by 
reaping scale economies. 
 
Table A7 in Appendix provides some indication of the extent of overinvestment.  
The measure used is the Savings – Investment Gap.  There is a marked difference 
in the S-I gaps of the crisis countries compared to affected countries.  Whereas the 
latter group of countries shows strong positive gaps, the crisis countries with the 
exception of Indonesia which is marginally positive, all have negative gaps.  
Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea have had negative gaps in everyone of the 
seven years.  With aggregate domestic savings averaging in excess of 30% of 
GDP, the negative gaps are not by any means the result of anaemic savings rates 
but clearly of overinvestment. 
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4.4:  Credit Booms & Overextended Banking Sectors 
 
The link from growth in monetary aggregates, (M1, M2) to investment growth 
works through bank credits.  Average annual growth rate in bank credit to the 
private sector in the crisis countries has approximated 20%.7  This compares with 
average M2 growth of 15.7% per year and GDP growth of 12.5%.  As an order of 
magnitude, a 20% annual growth rate doubles the total outstanding loan amount 
every 3.8 years.  Domestic credit growth over the 7 year period is shown in Table 
A8.  Both Thailand and Indonesia have had annual average growth of 21% and 
25%.  Malaysia and South Korea have had slightly lower rates of 19.5% and 
17.7% respectively.  The result of such rapid credit growth in the crisis countries 
has been two fold.  First, the banking sector has overextended and second, the 
corporate sector over leveraged.  On the surface, it is hard to understand why hard 
nosed bankers and rational corporate treasurers would have allowed this to 
happen.  The key is in the composition and type of loans created.  Most of the 
loans it appears were of short term maturity and carried floating interest rates.  
Furthermore, they had largely been collateralized.  Add to this the fact that there 
are implicit and explicit guarantees of bailouts and we can see why over lending 
makes sense to bankers. 
 
From a banker’s viewpoint a shorter term loan carries less credit risk.  A floating 
rate loan eliminates all interest rate risk to the banker since he simply passes it on 
to the borrower.  Additionally since the loan is collateralized he perceives little 
default risk.  From a corporate treasurer’s viewpoint such loans make sense for a 
number of reasons.  Ideally, he should want longer term rather than short term 
loans to match the maturity of his investment projects which are typically medium 
to long term.  However, in the absence of long term bond markets and infantile 
equity markets, the bank loans make sense.  Though floating interest rates increase 
his exposure to interest rate movements, he is still better off in cost of fund terms.  
Since the cost of equity is almost always higher than the cost of debt, while rising 
interest rates would mean higher cost on the bank loan, the cost of equity would be 
even higher had he used equity financing instead.8  Finally, when the assets he 
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provides the banker have been grossly overvalued because of asset inflation and 
second and third charges are possible on the same assets, the bank loan makes 
good sense. 
 
When the above relationship continues for some time, overinvestment is the result.  
Companies faced with cheap and easy credit begin undertaking marginal projects.  
Project risk assessments get ignored.  Companies become over leveraged since the 
proportion of their debt to equity becomes overbearing.  In Korea for example, the 
average debt to equity ratio for the Chaebols just prior to the crisis was 400%.9  
Excessive leverage causes a number of problems to companies.  It increases the 
volatility of company cash flows, increases break-even points10 and magnifies 
earnings and losses.  The net impact is to increase the vulnerability of the 
leveraged firm to even small reductions in revenue growth.  When the corporate 
sector becomes vulnerable because of excess leverage, the banking system 
becomes vulnerable too. 
 
As with most other things, when leverage gets beyond a certain point, it creates yet 
another problem; that of perverse incentives – or more commonly known as moral 
hazard.  Decision makers in highly leveraged firms will have the incentive to take 
on consistently higher risk projects, even if the projects do not make economic 
sense.  Since the equity stake is small, shareholders and their agents, the managers, 
face little financial loss (relative to the lenders) in the event of failure but stand to 
gain substantially as residual claimants if the project succeeds.  It is this 
disproportionate distribution of returns that induces perverse incentives and 
aggravates the moral hazard problem.  There is a flip side to this argument.  Just as 
corporations stand to loose little in the event of investment failure, bankers too 
stand to lose little in the face of deposit guarantees by the government.  Bankers 
therefore would have the incentive to lend even to risky projects partl because 
they have received collateral and partly because their depositors funds are 
“guaranteed”. 
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Loose monetary policies aside, the problem of overextended banks has also to do 
with the way banking is conducted in East Asia.  Asian bankers still appear to 
make loan decisions on the availability of collateral rather than the strength of 
project cash flows.  The emphasis on collateral rather than cash flows is probably 
the best explanation why rational bankers seem so exposed to ill conceived 
projects.  When bankers find safety in collateral rather than cash flows, there are 
no checks to asset price inflation and credit expansion. 
 
What happens when we have a corporate sector that is highly leveraged, has 
interest rate exposure, faces serious maturity mismatches11 and a banking sector 
that is over exposed to this same corporates?  The result  is twofold.  First, we 
have a highly vulnerable economy and second, a vastly reduced number of options 
available to policy  makers in the event of a crisis. 
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4.5:  The Problem with Pegged Exchange Rates 
 
Everyone of our sample countries have had some form of pegged exchange rate 
policy to the US dollar.  Hong Kong has a currency board system with the HK 
Dollar at a fixed peg to the US dollar.  The other countries have policies that peg 
their currency within narrow bands to the USD.  The objective of pegged rates to 
the Dollar makes sense in that it keeps the domestic currency stable and thereby 
reduces the currency exposure of domestic importers and exporters, an important 
consideration for the sample countries all of which are reliant on foreign trade.  
However, pegged exchange rate systems require careful management to avoid 
problems.  There are several problems associated with maintaining pegged rates 
and the difficult part is that they have an insidious way of creeping in unnoticed.  
A first problem is that a policy to maintain a peg reduces domestic policy 
flexibility – particularly monetary policy.  To maintain a peg, domestic policies 
must be in line with those of the country to whose currency the domestic currency 
is being pegged.  Deviations would put stress on the pegged rate.  If policies have 
deviated sufficiently to cause underlying economic fundamentals to be very 
different, the pegged rate becomes vulnerable to a speculative attack. 
 
A second problem is that, as a result of the peg, the domestic currency becomes 
over or undervalued against other currencies as the peg currency moves.  With 
policy makers focusing attention on movements against the peg currency, 
appreciation/depreciation against the other currencies often do not get due 
attention.  Overtime, the nation’s competitiveness gets eroded and it shows up as 
Current Account and Balance of Payments problems. 
 
A third and perhaps the most insidious form of problem is when the domestic 
currency gets to be overvalued in real terms eventhough the nominal exchange rate 
is at or near the peg rate (i.e. within the band).  This typically happens when 
domestic policies have been much ‘looser’ than that of the pegged country.  It is 
this kind of problem that increases a currency’s vulnerability to attack. 
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All four of our crisis countries faced the abovenamed three problems.  First, over 
the period 1995 – 1997, the US$ had appreciated gradually against other 
currencies.  This had to do with strong economic fundamentals and low inflation 
rates in the US.  As such the pegged currencies also appreciated against other 
currencies.  This certainly affected the export competitiveness of these countries.  
Part of the increases in current account deficits were probably due to this currency 
appreciation.  The second problem of deviating economic policies was also 
evident.  The crisis countries, undertook policies that were far more expansionary 
than that of the US.  This is particularly evident in the case of M2 growth.  Recall 
from Table 2, that the average annual M2 growth for the seven year period for 
these countries was 15.5%.  This compares with 2.14% for the US.  This means 
that the annual difference in monetary growth is more than 7 times.  Obviously 
with these levels of deviation, exchange rates had to change.  However, the fact 
that nominal exchange rates were maintained near peg levels meant that real 
exchange rates became overvalued.  This is accentuated further by deviations in 
inflation rates.  Recall from Table A5 that the average annual inflation rates were 
5.75% for crisis countries and 2.6% for the US.  At these rates, Purchasing Power 
Parity would have required the Asian currencies to devalue.  That they were 
pegged meant overvaluation.  To determine the extent of exchange rate deviation 
from parity, real exchange rates were computed for each country.  This was 
determined using the standard Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) equation as; 
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Table 3 
 
Real Exchange Rate Overvaluation (%) 
As at Dec. 1996 
 
Malaysia 12.5% 
Thailand 31.3% 
Indonesia 75.1% 
South Korea 35.4% 
  
Singapore (21.4)% undervalued 
Hong Kong 28.07% 
Taiwan 6.8% 
 
Not surprisingly, everyone of the crisis countries’ currencies have been overvalued 
by the PPP yardstick.  The Ringgit has the least overvaluation while the Rupiah 
the highest.  Both the Thai Baht and the Korean Won are overvalued in excess of 
30%.  The Singapore Dollar is undervalued by about 21% , while Taiwan’s NTD 
marginally overvalued.  Note that once again Hong Kong is different within the 
affected countries group.  The HK Dollar is overvalued by some 28%. 
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4.6:  Current Account Deficits & Capital Inflows 
 
Current account deficits have been pointed out as one of the key reasons for the 
currency crisis.  This issue is analyzed in Table A9 in Appendix.  The table shows 
the current account deficit as percent of nominal GDP.  Everyone of the crisis 
countries have had on average a current account deficit.  For the year 1996, 
Thailand and South Korea have deficits of 8% and 6%, while Malaysia 
approximately 5%.  In comparison, the average for the affected countries shows 
strong surpluses.  Singapore has had the highest with an average 12% current 
account surplus for the 7-year period.  Hong Kong had a 2% deficit in 1996 
despite strong surpluses in the early 90s. 
 
Based on our analysis thus far, the current account deficits should not be 
surprising.  A number of reasons can be cited as causal factors.  First and foremost 
is probably the high growth strategies of these countries.  As mentioned earlier, 
the push for rapid GDP required heavy investment growth.  From a theoretical 
viewpoint, a country is likely to run current account deficits if it has a savings – 
investment gap.  Essentially, the savings – investment gap reflects the net imports 
needed to finance the gap.  Slowing GDP growth to equate domestic savings to 
needed investments would reduce the current account deficit but a high growth 
strategy would increase it.  Though East Asia is legendary for its high savings rate 
(approximately 30% of GDP), as pointed out earlier, Gross Investments as percent 
of GDP has averaged 40% in the 7-year period. 
 
A second obvious reason for the deficit is the currency overvaluation.  Overvalued 
currencies encourage imports by making imports cheaper relative to domestic 
prices and can act to discourage exports priced in foreign currency by making 
domestic currency proceeds less, relative to domestic prices.  As a result of this 
distorted price signals, the net impact of a consistent overvaluation would be 
severe current account deficits. 
 
 26 
In addition, the huge consumption boom that resulted from rising incomes and the 
heavy capital imports needed for investment projects were also contributory 
factors.  A final factor has to do with the tradable/non-tradable sectors.  As was 
argued earlier, much of the overinvestment flowed into areas such as property 
development, real estate and infrastructure.  Unlike investments in tradables that 
increase production capacity and therefore export capacity, expansion in non-
tradables does not.  Yet, if such investments necessitate capital imports, current 
account deficits are likely. 
 
The flip side of a current account deficit is a capital account surplus.  Holding 
reserves constant, a current account deficit must be matched by a capital account 
surplus.  What this implies is that; the net imports of the current account will have 
to be financed by foreign capital inflows.  As such, all our crisis countries have 
had capital account surpluses; meaning strong capital inflows.  Large capital 
inflows in itself is not a problem.  It is the form and composition of the inflows 
that really matters.  Inflows in the form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) are 
long term in nature and add to productive capacity.  However, inflows in the form 
of Portfolio Investments or short term deposits/borrowing can be destabilizing.  
Tracing the composition of capital inflows from the mid 1980s on; shows an 
increased reliance on short term inflows.  Though FDI inflows still constituted a 
major portion, short term inflows in the form of portfolio investments and 
borrowing were increasing.  Tables A11, A12 and A13 of Appendix show the 
increased reliance on loans and the composition of these loans.  In each case we 
see a gradual increase in total Foreign Loans both in absolute terms and as percent 
of GDP.  Total foreign loans as a percentage of GDP approaches 40% for Thailand 
and exceeds 25% for Indonesia and South Korea.  Malaysia’s foreign loans stand 
at 22% of GDP as at December 1996.  Table A13 shows the composition of these 
loans.  Short term loans constitute more than two thirds of total loans for Korea.  
Thailand’s exceeds 65% while Indonesia’s is at 59%.  Clearly, in all four cases, 
there has been a heavy reliance of short term inflows. 
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Though both portfolio and short term inflows constitute liabilities of a temporary 
nature for recipient countries, the latter involved an additional risk dimension, that 
of currency risk.  In portfolio investments, foreign mutual funds in order to 
purchase equity instruments had first to convert their currency to domestic 
currency.  Thus, the foreign mutual funds carried both the price risk and exchange 
rate risk.  In the case of short term inflows however, it was largely the result of 
private sector borrowing.  These were foreign currency denominated (largely US$) 
loans.  With such US Dollar denominated loans, the borrowing corporations were 
faced with exchange rate risk in addition to their being leveraged.  There was yet 
another, perhaps more dangerous dimension to these short term inflows.  Domestic 
banks were also getting into the act.  This was particularly evident in the case of 
Thailand and South Korea and to a lesser extent in Indonesia.  Domestic banks 
were raising short term funds at variable interest rates at offshore financial centers 
and recycling them as local currency loans to domestic borrowers.  The banks 
therefore were taking on the currency risk.  Interestingly, neither the domestic 
corporations nor banks that were borrowing in foreign currency were hedging their 
exposure.  It appears from post-crisis events that most of these loans were 
unhedged. 
 
Why were rational bankers and corporate treasurers taking on such additional 
risks?  It was not recklessness but in some ways quite rational behavior.  There 
were a number of reasons for this reliance on unhedged foreign currency loans.  
The first and most important reason is probably the pegged exchange rate regime.  
Sustained periods of pegged exchange rates and success at maintaining the pegs, 
particularly during the period of contagion following the 1994 Mexican Peso 
crisis12 meant that domestic borrowers were lulled into ignoring currency risk.  
Exchange rate risk did not seem a sufficiently large impediment to borrowing in 
foreign currency.  Given past experience, with stable exchange rates, unhedged 
positions did not appear reckless. 
 
Infantile domestic bond markets were yet another reason.  Without well developed 
bond markets, it was difficult for large corporations and banks to raise long term 
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bond financing.  With little choice for domestic funds, foreign borrowing was the 
result.  In the face of all these, the central banks of the crisis countries appear to 
have been passive.  A policy of benign neglect appears to have been the rule.  
Perhaps it was to prevent any crowding out if large loans were financed 
domestically.  A third factor leading to excessive reliance on foreign currency debt 
had to do with financial liberalization that eroded the barriers between domestic 
money markets and the foreign exchange markets.  As part of capital account 
liberalization, offshore financial systems were established.  This made foreign 
currency loan origination that much easier.  These offshore centers played a major 
role in the loan buildup.  The best example being the Bangkok International 
Banking Facility (BIBF).  Thai Banks used the facility to raise foreign currency 
loans which were then lent domestically as Baht loans.  The rationale for Thai 
banks was that they were earning lucrative interest spreads.  However, the huge 
currency exposure were being ignored by the banks.  Finally, a contributing factor 
to the short term bias of the capital inflows was the sterilization attempts of the 
central banks.  Without long term bond markets, sterilization of inflows had to be 
done with short term instruments.  Recall that this is similar to the Mexican central 
bank sterilization which aggravated the short term habitat of the capital inflows. 
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Section 5.0 
 
5.1:  Vulnerability, Herd Behavior & Self Fulfilling Crises 
 
Unlike the first generation (canonical) models that attempted to explain currency 
crises as arising solely from balance of payments problems or weak fundamentals, 
the later, second generation models also take into account psychological factors on 
the part of investors.  Particularly, herding behavior which could lead to self 
fulfilling currency crises.  In perhaps the best proposition of these latter generation 
models, Calvo & Mendoza (1996) argue that the Mexican Peso crisis of 1995 was 
really a self fulfilling crisis that resulted from herding behavior of international 
investors.  They go on to propose that such herding is rational even optimal, given 
constraints faced by large well diversified investors and the high degree of capital 
mobility. 
 
Herding behavior refers to the propensity of investors to act as a pack.  That 
investors often act as a group and a single investor often does what he sees others 
doing has been long established in financial economics – particularly in the area of 
stock market behavior.  An entire school of thought of stock price behavior, the 
Technical Analysis or Chartist School is built on these principles of mass 
psychology.  To understand herding behavior in forex markets, we first need to 
understand the need for diversification. 
 
Large investors, in order to reduce risk need to diversify across many assets.  In 
this case across many currencies.  Beginning with an investment concentrated on a 
single asset (currency), the investor derives diversification benefits as he spreads 
his investment across a broader array of currencies (assets).  The diversification 
benefit, refers to the reduction in risk-that is, reduced volatility of returns for the 
same expected returns.  As diversification is increased, total portfolio risk keeps 
falling – but only up to a point.  Beyond a certain point further diversification does 
not reduce risk.13  The empirical evidence from stocks is that this point of minimal 
portfolio risk can be reached with 20 to 30 stocks.14  So, any further additions to 
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the portfolio beyond 20 stocks for example provides marginal benefits.  What is 
interesting is that, given a universe of many stocks, the risk minimizing portfolio 
can be arrived at with any combination of 20 to 30 stocks.  There is no unique 
combination of 20 stocks that leads to risk minimization.  This has to do with the 
fact that the correlation between asset returns are typically within the +1.0 to –1.0 
range. 
 
The fact that only a limited number of assets is needed to reach this ‘full 
diversification’ and that this can be of any combination can explain herding 
behavior and the impact of such behavior on ‘small countries’ with open 
economies.  From the viewpoint of an international fund manager, he knows he 
needs to diversify by holding currencies or assets denominated in various 
currencies.  So, typically in addition to holding a core set of OECD currencies, he 
would need to hold some other currencies for the sake of diversification.  
However, given the wide array of available currencies and the fact that to be fully 
diversified he needs only a subset of the available currencies, he would be 
indifferent about which currency to include in his portfolio.  Since, from a 
portfolio diversification viewpoint there is marginal difference between the 
currency of Country X versus that of Country Y, it does not pay for him to invest 
in the resources needed to understand in detail either country’s economic 
fundamentals.  Highly diversified international fund managers have neither the 
incentive nor inclination to acquire intimate details about developing country 
currencies.  It is easier and a lot cheaper for them to merely follow what others are 
doing.  Thus, if they see a few major funds moving into a currency, they too move 
in and vice-versa. 
 
Aside from the logic of diversification, compensation is one other factor that 
perpetrates herding behavior.  This happens because fund manager’s performance 
is typically evaluated in comparison to some index or industry average.  When 
they are being evaluated against their peers, conformity always pays. 
 
5.2:  Herding & Informational Asymmetries 
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When herding behavior happens within a framework of incomplete information or 
information asymmetries, the potential for an explosive self fulfilling crisis is that 
much more.  Informational asymmetry refers to the imbalance in the information 
available to the parties in a transaction.  For example, when a foreign fund 
manager receives less information than that known to a recipient government or 
corporation, an information asymmetry exists.  This may be due to inadequate 
disclosure requirements or simply, a lack of transparency.  However, as long as the 
fund manager sees others providing funds and there is an overall perception that 
their investments will yield good returns, this informational inadequacy is 
overlooked.  Furthermore, the fund manager knows that in the event of potential 
problems he can quickly withdraw his funds.  What risk does the fund manager 
face?  Because his investment is highly liquid and mobile, he doesn’t worry about 
expropriations the way FDI investors do.  Fund managers also avoid countries that 
have a record of capital controls.  Their real fear therefore is that of a currency 
devaluation.  It is perceptions of an economy’s underlying fundamentals and 
expectations about devaluations that hold the key to this balancing act between 
recipient economies and foreign fund managers.  As underlying fundamentals 
begin to deteriorate, perceptions change.  The problems of informational 
asymmetry become more apparent.  The fund managers become susceptible to 
even minor events.  They begin to worry about adverse selection problems.15  With 
expectations of potential problems being formed, all that is needed for a self 
fulfilling crisis is an exogenous shock.  In the case of Mexico it was the 
announcement of the ill conceived devaluation and in the case of Asia, Thailand’s 
announcement to float the Baht.  The decision to float followed the speculative 
attack on the Baht. 
 
What links changing perceptions and expectations to a full blown self fulfilling 
crisis is vulnerability.  Both the speculators, who initiate attacks on a currency and 
fund managers whose withdrawals cause capital flight are rational economic 
agents.  Speculators in particular, know they have much to lose should their 
actions fail.  They would not therefore initiate an attack unless they consider the 
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economy to be vulnerable and their probability of success greater than even.  
While there is no telling when a country has passed the threshold to become 
vulnerable, vulnerability becomes apparent when a country has reduced policy 
options because it has worked itself into a corner and the odds are heavily stacked 
against the Central Bank.  As an example of this vulnerability, recall from Table 
A13, the proportion of short term debt to reserves for our crisis countries.  
Consider the following, as of December 1996 which was 6 to 7 months before the 
crisis, total foreign loans were almost twice total reserves for Thailand and thrice 
in the case of Korea.  Almost two thirds of these loans were short term debt.  The 
ultimate sign of vulnerability is probably the proportion of short term foreign debt 
to total reserves.  As the above table showed, these were 118% for Thailand and 
202.5% for Korea. 
 
With numbers like these and informational asymmetries it is no surprise that fund 
managers would desert once a currency comes under speculative attack.  Capital 
flight in the face of a speculative attack can overwhelm just about any defense. 
 
 
 
 
5.3:  Mexico 1995 and Asia 1997: What Were The Similarities 
 
Sachs et al: (1996) in an indepth analysis of the contagion effect resulting from the 
Mexican crisis argue that contagion only affects countries that had “misbehaved” 
in the past.  The authors point out that while several countries, particularly 
Argentina, Brazil and the Philippines were affected, others with similarly weak 
indicators did not.  And as example of such countries, the authors had pointed to 
Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.   Yet, two years later these same countries 
suffered their own crisis. 
 
Our discussion thus far of the Asian crisis and the earlier overview of the Mexican 
crisis of 1994 point to several similarities.  We now turn to an examination of the 
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many parallels between what happened in Mexico leading to the crisis and those 
of our Asian crisis countries.  In both cases, the period preceding the crisis had 
been one of an economic boom but with growth rates tapering off just before the 
crisis.  The rapid GDP growth in both Mexico and the Asian Crisis Countries had 
been financed with huge capital inflows, mostly in the form of foreign currency 
denominated loans.  Most of these loans were also of a short term nature.  The 
Savings-Investment gap that resulted from hyper-growth was also being financed 
by Current Account deficits.  Relative to Mexico, the Asian crisis countries, with 
the exception of Korea were less reliant on short term debt but had worse current 
account deficits.  In both cases, privatization, deregulation of the financial sector16  
and capital account liberalization had all taken place.  Other common features 
were overvalued currencies due to pegged exchange rate system, and the resultant 
transfer of currency risks to domestic banks.  Reserves were low compared to 
GDP and total foreign debt. 
 
Though there was fiscal balance in both cases, there was also monetary policy 
looseness.  Monetary growth had been rapid, credit booms and banking sector 
overexposure were also evident in both cases.  To be sure, Mexico had political 
problems, the Chiapas revolution and political assassinations.   These added to the 
uncertainties in the period leading to the crisis.  Still, from an economic 
fundamentals viewpoint there were clearly too many similarities.  Despite at least 
a two year headstart, the Asian countries seem to have chosen the same path.  The 
lesson of Mexico 1995 appears to have been missed. 
  
5.4:  Hong Kong and Malaysia: The Importance of Policy Options 
 
 In this section, a comparison of underlying fundamentals and policy reaction 
between Hong Kong and Malaysia is carried out.  The rationale for such a 
comparison is based on the many similarities between the two countries leading to 
the crisis but the varied reaction and degree of success in defending their 
respective currencies.  If we evaluate the countries within each of the two groups; 
crisis versus affected, it is quite apparent that in the crisis group, Malaysia has the 
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best fundamentals overall and Hong Kong the worst within the affected countries 
group.  Inter country comparison shows many similarities.  For example, in the 
case of average growth in M1 and M2, both countries had similar numbers though 
it was slightly higher for Malaysia.  The same could be said for Domestic Credit 
Growth and the Savings Investment Gap.  Hong Kong had also had its share of 
asset inflation in the property sector.  However, in areas like interest rate deviation 
and key currency market indicators like CPI growth and degree of overvaluation, 
Hong Kong had worse numbers relative to Malaysia.  Hong Kong’s average CPI 
growth of 6.4% is much higher than Malaysia’s average 3.3%. 
 
In the case of real exchange rate overvaluation, the Hong Kong Dollar’s 
overvaluation of 28% is more than twice the overvaluation of the Ringgit at 
12.5%.  While it is true that Malaysia had much worse debt numbers and current 
account deficits, Hong Kong too recorded a 2% current account deficit in 1996 
compared with 5% for Malaysia. 
 
Based on these, one could reasonably state that while Hong Kong did have some 
strong points its numbers are not all that different from Malaysia’s.  At least not 
sufficiently different to warrant the huge disparity in currency movement.  As of 
January 1998, the Ringgit had fallen to an all time low of 4.98 against the US 
Dollar, a depreciation in excess of 50%.17  Yet, the Hong Kong Dollar had not 
budged from its pegged rate of 7.80.  What accounts for this very different 
currency market outcomes?  It surely was not for want of a speculative attack on 
the HK$.  Hong Kong saw some of the most spectacular attacks on its currency.  
One might be tempted to argue that it was Hong Kong’s currency board 
arrangement that let it hold on to the peg.  But this would be ignoring the quite 
severe deviations in parity conditions.  It is common knowledge that Hong Kong 
had allowed its interest rates and money supply to deviate from what was required 
to maintain parity with the US.  As a result, the currency had become quite 
substantially overvalued (28%).   Thus, the specie flow argument of a currency 
board system does not hold here.  Clearly, Hong Kong’s Dollar is not being 
backed 100%.  In the face of such weaknesses, it is not surprising that the HK$ 
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came under heavy attack.  Yet, inspite of the fact that it is a lot more difficult to 
defend a single peg rate as opposed to a band, Hong Kong managed. 
 
How did Hong Kong fare so differently from Malaysia?  Hong Kong had two 
major advantages over Malaysia.  First, it had a much larger arsenal – i.e. foreign 
reserves.  At approximately US$75 billion, Hong Kong’s reserves were almost 3 
times that of Malaysia’s at US$26 billion.  Second, unlike Bank Negara, the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority had much more policy flexibility going into the crisis.  
Between these two advantages, the latter was probably the more important one.  In 
a world of ‘virtual’ money, foreign reserves, even large ones are no guarantee of 
successful defense.  But when combined with the ability to adopt a wider range of 
policy options, a formidable defense can be put up. 
 
Of the several options available to a central bank in defending its currency, the 
two most important ones are probably direct intervention and the ability to raise 
interest rates.  When it comes to direct intervention, fortitude depends on the size 
of reserves but the ability to raise interest rates could quickly abate further attacks 
and therefore the need for continuing intervention.18  The key is the ability to raise 
and maintain higher interest rates.  The problem with raising and keeping interest 
rates high is that it quickly begins to hurt the real sector of the economy.  At low 
levels of leverage the pain is bearable but when the overall economy has high 
levels of debt and the banking sector exposed, the interest rate option is not viable.  
The central bank faces a major tradeoff between saving the exchange rate and 
saving the domestic banking sector.  If high interest rates could mean bank 
collapses and systemic risks, central banks will shy away from the interest rate 
option.  The cost of maintaining the exchange rate appears too high. 
 
If high debt levels in the economy reduces the available policy options, what 
happens if a good portion of the debt is foreign currency denominated?  Then the 
central bank faces a potential lose-lose situation.  Raising interest rates to maintain 
the exchange rate hurts leveraged firms and banks but the alternative of not raising 
rates and allowing the currency to depreciate raises home currency value of the 
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foreign debt and debt servicing requirements.  So, having a leveraged economy 
with foreign currency debt really renders central banks impotent in the face of 
speculative attacks.  The unfortunate part of all these is that speculators, being 
rational people can tell when a central bank will be forced to defend with one hand 
tied, by not being able to raise interest rates, and when the central bank is totally 
helpless because of foreign currency loans. 
 
The severe fall in the Ringgit as opposed to the successful defense of the HK$ has 
to do with the fact that the Hong Kong Monetary Authority could and did use the 
interest rate option.  They raised interest rates and kept it at very high levels for 
substantially longer than Bank Negara could.  High leverage not only reduces the 
available policy options but precisely because it does so, increases vulnerability. 
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Section 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our discussion thus far has served to highlight the many differences in economic 
fundamentals between the crisis and affected countries.  Clearly, there are several 
differences. Overall, the crisis countries have had aggressive growth policies that 
were fuelled by reflationary strategies – particularly rapid monetary growth and 
capital inflows.  Monetary growth which was several times in excess of real sector 
growth coupled with repressed interest rates had led to asset inflation and 
increased allocation to non tradeables.  The result had been current account 
deficits and domestic inflation.  With higher relative inflation and repressed 
interest rates, exchange rate equilibrium as dictated by purchasing power and 
interest rate parities were out of line.  With pegged exchange rates, the currencies 
had become overvalued, thereby worsening further the current account deficits.  
These were financed with capital inflows increasingly in the form of short term 
and foreign currency denominated debt.  The combined impact of all of this had 
been to increase the crisis countries’ vulnerability to a speculative attack and self 
fulfilling crisis. 
 
Is there anything new about this crisis?  None, if we go by the literature.  The 
earlier cited empirical work by Frankel & Rose (1996), Whitt (1996) Calvo & 
Mendoza (1995) and Sachs et al (1996) all point to similar indicators.  Sachs et al; 
argue that for contagion and crisis to happen; there must have been some ‘degree 
of previous misbehavior’ – particularly with regards to maintaining overvalued 
exchange rates, loose monetary policies and domestic credit booms.  Clearly all 
three were evident in the crisis countries.  Calvo & Mendoza (1996) show that it 
was expectations that the Mexican Central Bank would choose to save the banks 
and not the exchange rate that set off the massive capital outflows precipitating the 
Peso crisis.  We saw that the Asian Central banks were caught in similar jeopardy 
given highly leveraged domestic economies.  So, from an economic fundamentals 
viewpoint there appears to be nothing new about this crisis. 
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What can we learn from the crisis?  Briefly, a number of important factors.  First, 
to avoid crisis, one must reduce vulnerability.  Reducing vulnerability means 
many things.  Among others it means reducing growth if necessary, reduced 
reliance on foreign short term capital and most importantly keeping policy options 
open.  A second important lesson would be that liberalization without proper 
preparation is disastrous.  Banking and financial liberalization must be preceeded 
by prior placement of effective supervision and regulatory mechanisms.  In this 
regard, aside from developing domestic bonds markets, the development of risk 
management tools would also be necessary.  With adequate provision of risk 
management tools/markets, central banks need not take on the role of “hedging” 
on behalf of their countries. 
 
A final important lesson would be the need on the part of policymakers to better 
understand how markets work and how markets could be used advantageously.  In 
a world of ‘fiat’ currencies confidence is key and central bankers must realize that 
they cannot legislate confidence in their currencies.  When markets are jittery, “the 
best antidote is more information”19 not more assurances.     
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Endnote: 
                                                           
1
 See:  Frankel & Kose 96, Goldfajn & Valdes 1997. 
 
2
  In subsequent MLE regression analysis, the authors find current account and budget deficits to 
have low   predictive power and inappropriately signed. 
 
3
  Where available, 1997 data are also use. 
 
4
 The categorization is simply based on the extent of the respective country’s currency 
devaluation until Jan 1998.  (HK being the exception. Though the currency did not depreciate, 
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it certainly saw massive attacks). This categorization would also conform with Frankel & 
Kose’s classification of a 25% fall in currency as a crash.  By this, our crisis countries would 
all have had a crash while the affected countries did not. 
 
5
 For an indepth analysis of the Mexican crisis; see; Joseph Witt Jr. (1996) and Calvo & 
Mendoza (1996). 
 
6
 These were Annulized 90-day interest rates reported for the year in Datastream. 
 
7
 Author’s estimate based on several data sources. 
 
8
 Cost of equity is always higher since equity holders carry more risk – eg. uncertain dividends,  
  residual claims etc..  Cost of equity models determine cost on a risk premium approach. 
 
9
 The Economist – Mar 7 – 15, 1998. 
 
10
 Because interest expense is a fixed cost. 
 
11
 A maturity mismatch is when long term needs have been financed with short term financing. 
 
12
 See Ayub Ali, 1998. 
 
13
 The portion of risk that has been diversified away is known in the literature, as unsystematic  
    risk.  The residual portion that cannot be diversified away is systematic risk. 
 
14
 Ibbotson & Sinquefield (1982). 
 
15
 Adverse selection refers to the possibility of making incorrect selection/decision in the face of  
    inadequate information. 
 
16
 In Mexico’s case, as prerequisite for NAFTA. 
 
17
 % Depreciation is computed as; ( ) 100
11
x
e
eoe 



−  
18
 Raising interest rates, raises the cost of funds to speculators who have taken short positions in  
    the currency.  
 
19
 See: Ayub Ali (1998). 
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TABLE A 1 
NOMINAL GDP GROWTH RATE ( % )  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 AVERAGE 
THAILAND 14% 12% 11% 13% 14% 9% 12% 
INDONESIA 15% 13% 24% 15% 17% 16% 17% 
SOUTH KOREA 18% 11% 10% 13% 14% 10% 13% 
MALAYSIA 11% 14% 11% 14% 14% 13% 13% 
15% 13% 14% 14% 15% 12% 14% 
AVERAGE 
SINGAPORE 10% 7% 15% 14% 11% 9% 11% 
HONGKONG 14% 15% 14% 12% 6% 10% 12% 
TAIWAN 11% 10% 10% 8% 8% 8% 9% 
AVERAGE 12% 11% 13% 11% 8% 9% 
TABLE A 2 
1990 - 96  REAL  GDP GROWTH RATE ( % )  
 Average Annual 
Growth  (%) 
THAILAND 6.86 
INDONESIA 6.22 
SOUTH KOREA 6.31 
MALAYSIA 7.33 
AVERAGE 6.68 
SINGAPORE 7.08 
HONGKONG 4.6 
TAIWAN 5.53 
AVERAGE 5.74 
UNITED STATES 1.75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A 3 
ANNUAL M1 GROWTH RATE  ( % ) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 AVERAGE 
THAILAND 13% 12% 17% 16% 11% 9% 13% 
INDONESIA 10% 9% -6% 52% 14% 20% 17% 
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SOUTH KOREA 31% 12% 17% 11% 18% 2% 15% 
MALAYSIA 10% 10% -15% 61% 10% 14% 15% 
AVERAGE 16% 11% 3% 35% 13% 11% 
SINGAPORE 7% 12% 21% 2% 8% 6% 9% 
HONGKONG 18% 19% 19% -1% 3% 13% 12% 
TAIWAN 6% 8% 12% 8% -5% 4% 6% 
AVERAGE 10% 13% 17% 3% 2% 8% 
TABLE A 4 
ANNUAL  M2 GROWTH RATE  ( % ) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 AVERAGE 
THAILAND 18% 14% 17% 12% 16% 12% 15% 
INDONESIA 16% 18% 20% 18% 24% 26% 20% 
SOUTH KOREA 20% 14% 15% 17% 14% 15% 16% 
MALAYSIA 12% 16% 17% 20% 15% 21% 17% 
AVERAGE 17% 16% 17% 17% 17% 19% 
SINGAPORE 12% 9% 8% 13% 8% 9% 10% 
HONGKONG 12% 10% 15% 12% 13% 11% 12% 
TAIWAN 18% 17% 14% 14% 9% 9% 14% 
AVERAGE 14% 12% 12% 13% 10% 10% 
TABLE A 5 
ANNUAL CPI GROWTH RATE  ( % ) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 AVERAGE 
THAILAND 5% 4% 4% 6% 6% 5% 5% 
INDONESIA 9% 7% 9% 8% 9% 8% 8% 
SOUTH KOREA 9% 6% 5% 6% 4% 5% 6% 
MALAYSIA 4% 5% 3% 4% 3% 3% 4% 
AVERAGE 5.75% 
SINGAPORE 3% 2% 2% 3% 2% 1% 2% 
HONGKONG 0% 6% 8% 8% 8% 6% 7.20% 
TAIWAN 4% 4% 3% 4% 4% 3% 4% 
AVERAGE 4.40% 
UNITED STATES 2.60% 
TABLE A 6 
ABSOLUTE % CHANGE IN NOMINAL INTEREST RATES   (It -It-1) 
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Mean CPI
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 E( (It -It-1) E( (It -It-1)/n) Growth
THAILAND NA NA 1.25 -0.75 4.50 -3.25 1.75 0.44 5.00
INDONESIA -0.31 -5.82 -4.10 3.60 1.07 -0.57 -6.13 -1.02 8.00
SOUTH KOREA NA NA NA -3.30 3.30 -3.00 -3.00 -1.00 6.00
MALAYSIA 1.20 0.40 -1.20 -2.80 1.80 0.90 0.30 0.05 4.00
SINGAPORE -1.21 -1.38 -0.20 1.36 -0.21 0.00 -1.64 -0.27 2.00
HONGKONG -3.94 0.25 -0.56 2.56 -0.43 -0.33 -2.45 -0.41 7.20
TAIWAN -1.20 0.20 -0.20 -0.86 -0.80 0.10 -2.70 -0.45 4.00
              TABLE A 7 
SAVINGS - INVESTMENT GAP 
       (As  % of GDP) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 AVERAGE 
THAILAND (7.6) (6.4) (4.9) (4.5) (5.0) (7.5) (7.7) (6.2) 
INDONESIA (0.4) 1.7  1.5  5.1  1.6  0.6  0.7  1.5  
SOUTH KOREA (1.0) (2.5) (1.5) (0.8) (1.1) (1.5) (3.5) (1.7) 
MALAYSIA (3.3) (8.0) (4.7) (5.3) (7.3) (9.5) (5.5) (6.2) 
AVERAGE (3.1) (3.8) (2.4) (1.4) (3.0) (4.5) (4.0) (3.2) 
SINGAPORE 12.3  12.1  11.7  9.9  16.2  16.7  13.6  13.2  
HONGKONG 9.4  7.2  6.4  7.3  3.3  (0.1) (0.7) 4.7  
TAIWAN 6.9  7.3  4.6  4.0  4.2  5.1  7.0  5.6  
AVERAGE 9.5  8.9  7.6  7.1  7.9  7.2  6.6  7.83 
Source: IMF; World Econ. & Fin. Survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A 8 
                            DOMESTIC  CREDIT  GROWTH  (%) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Average 
THAILAND 26.8 15.5 18 22.7 28.9 23.1 14 21.3  
INDONESIA 58.3 18.9 14.1 21 22.9 21.7 22.7 25.7  
SOUTH KOREA 24.8 22.4 11.7 12.7 18.4 14.7 19.4 17.7  
MALAYSIA 18 18.5 16.6 12.3 14.8 29.5 27 19.5  
AVERAGE 33.7  19.9  14.1  15.3  18.7  22.0  23.0  
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SINGAPORE 12.3 13.9 5.5 12 12.8 17.4 17.3 13.0  
HONGKONG NA NA 9.6 21 25 8.6 18 16.4  
TAIWAN 17 26.3 28.5 19.8 16.5 10.6 10.1 18.4  
AVERAGE 14.7  20.1  14.5  17.6  18.1  12.2  15.1  
Source: IMF; World Econ. & Fin. Survey. 
                       TABLE A 9 
          CURRENT A/C DEFICIT AS A % OF GDP CURRENT) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 AVERAGE 
THAILAND -9% -8% -6% -5% -6% -8% -8% -7% 
INDONESIA -2% -2% -1% -1% -1% -1% -2% -1% 
SOUTH KOREA -1% -4% -2% 0% -1% -3% -6% -2% 
MALAYSIA NA NA -4% -5% -6% -10% -5% -6% 
AVERAGE -4% -5% -3% -3% -4% -6% -5% 
SINGAPORE 6% 8% 8% 9% 16% 17% 17% 12% 
HONGKONG 8% 7% 5% 7% 1% -4% -2% 3% 
TAIWAN 7% 7% 4% 3% 3% 2% 4% 4% 
AVERAGE 7% 7% 6% 6% 7% 5% 6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A 10 
FOREIGN RESERVES AS % OF GDP 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 AVERAGE 
THAILAND 17% 19% 19% 20% 21% 22% 21% 20% 
INDONESIA 14% 29% 48% 45% 38% 33% 30% 34% 
SOUTH KOREA 8% 6% 7% 8% 8% 9% 9% 8% 
MALAYSIA 20% 22% 26% 34% 44% 30% 27% 29% 
AVERAGE 11% 15% 21% 22% 23% 18% 17% 22.75% 
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SINGAPORE 71% 74% 81% 83% 78% 80% 87% 79% 
HONGKONG 33% 33% 35% 37% 38% 40% 41% 37% 
TAIWAN NA NA NA 36% 39% 35% 32% 36% 
AVERAGE 37% 38% 42% 42% 40% 41% 44% 50.67% 
     Table A 11 
 
TOTAL  FOREIGN  LOANS   (US $ Mil.) 
Dec-94 Dec-95 Jun-96 Dec-96 Jun-96 
THAILAND 43,879 62,818 69,409 70,147 69,382 
INDONESIA 34,970 44,528 49,306 55,523 58,726 
SOUTH KOREA 56,599 77,528 88,027 99,953 103,432 
MALAYSIA 13,493 16,781 20,100 22,234 28,820 
Source: BIS, Business Times. 
                Table A 12 
TOTAL FOREIGN  LOANS AS %  OF GDP 
Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 
THAILAND 30.4 37.4 38.7 
INDONESIA 19.8 22.1 24.5 
SOUTH KOREA 18.6 22.1 25.7 
MALAYSIA 18.6 19.2 22.4 
Author's Computation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table A 13 
FINANCIAL POSITION  (AS AT DEC. 96) 
Short 
Term  Short Term  Foreign Short Term  
Loans  
Loans as 
% Loans Loans as 
(US$ 
Mil.) of Total  as % of as % of 
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Foreign 
Loans Reserves Reserves 
THAILAND 45,733 65.20% 181% 118% 
INDONESIA 32,759 59.00% 81.60% 48.10% 
SOUTH KOREA 67,468 67.50% 300% 202.50% 
MALAYSIA 12,451 56.00% 83.90% 46.90% 
Author's Computation 
 
